A countermeasure against one physical cryptanalysis may benefit another attack

Sung Ming Yen, Seung-Joo Kim, Seongan Lim, Sangjae Moon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

63 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Recently, many research works have been reported about how physical cryptanalysis can be carried out on cryptographic devices by exploiting any possible leaked information through side channels. In this paper, we demonstrate a new type of safe-error based hardware fault cryptanalysis which is mounted on a recently reported countermeasure against simple power analysis attack. This safe-error based attack is developed by inducing a temporary random computational fault other than a temporary memory fault which was explicitly assumed in the first published safe-error based attack (in which more precisions on timing and fault location are assumed) proposed by Yen and Joye. Analysis shows that the new safe-error based attack proposed in this paper is powerful and feasible because the cryptanalytic complexity (especially the computational complexity) is quite small and the assumptions made are more reasonable. Existing research works considered many possible countermeasures against each kind of physical cryptanalysis. This paper and a few previous reports clearly show that a countermeasure developed against one physical attack does not necessarily thwart another kind of physical attack. However, almost no research has been done on dealing the possible mutual relationship between different kinds of physical cryptanalysis when choosing a specific countermeasure. Most importantly, in this paper we wish to emphasize that a countermeasure developed against one physical attack if not carefully examined may benefit another physical attack tremendously. This issue has never been explicitely noticed previously but its importance can not be overlooked because of the attack found in this paper. Notice that almost all the issues considered in this paper on a modular exponentiation also applies to a scalar multiplication over an elliptic curve.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages414-427
Number of pages14
Volume2288
ISBN (Print)3540433198, 9783540433194
Publication statusPublished - 2002
Externally publishedYes
Event4th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2001 - Seoul, Korea, Republic of
Duration: 2001 Dec 62001 Dec 7

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume2288
ISSN (Print)03029743
ISSN (Electronic)16113349

Other

Other4th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2001
CountryKorea, Republic of
CitySeoul
Period01/12/601/12/7

Keywords

  • Cryptography
  • Exponentiation
  • Hardware fault cryptanalysis
  • Physical cryptanalysis
  • Power analysis attack
  • Side channel attack
  • Square-multiply exponentiation
  • Timing attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Theoretical Computer Science

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'A countermeasure against one physical cryptanalysis may benefit another attack'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this

    Yen, S. M., Kim, S-J., Lim, S., & Moon, S. (2002). A countermeasure against one physical cryptanalysis may benefit another attack. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 2288, pp. 414-427). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 2288). Springer Verlag.