A folk theorem for asynchronously repeated games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We prove a Folk Theorem for asynchronously repeated games in which the set of players who can move in period t, denoted by I 1, is a random variable whose distribution is a function of the past action choices of the players and the past realizations of I τ's, τ = 1,2,...,t - 1. We impose a condition, the finite periods of inaction (FPI) condition, which requires that the number of periods in which every player has at least one opportunity to move is bounded. Given the FPI condition together with the standard nonequivalent utilities (NEU) condition, we show that every feasible and strictly individually rational payoff vector can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of an asynchronously repeated game.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)191-200
Number of pages10
JournalEconometrica
Volume69
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2001 Jan 1
Externally publishedYes

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Folk Theorem
Repeated Games
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Strictly
Random variable
Folk theorem
Repeated games

Keywords

  • Asynchronously repeated games
  • Folk Theorem

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

Cite this

A folk theorem for asynchronously repeated games. / Yoon, Kiho.

In: Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 1, 01.01.2001, p. 191-200.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Yoon, Kiho. / A folk theorem for asynchronously repeated games. In: Econometrica. 2001 ; Vol. 69, No. 1. pp. 191-200.
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