A stag hunt game with social norms

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper studies a stag hunt game in which each player's payoff depends on the level of social norms in a community. First, we establish conditions under which without social norms, there exists a unique equilibrium regarding the cooperation level, but with social norms, there can be multiple equilibria. Second, we provide the comparative statics analysis such that for a statics framework, the local stability of an interior equilibrium works as a sufficient condition under which the cooperation level increases as the degree of social norms increases; and for a dynamic framework, the cooperation level always increases with social norms.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)306-319
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
Volume24
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2013 Sep 1

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Social norms
Comparative static analysis
Local stability
Multiple equilibria

Keywords

  • Social norms
  • Stag hunt game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

A stag hunt game with social norms. / Yoo, Seung Han.

In: Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, Vol. 24, No. 3, 01.09.2013, p. 306-319.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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