A theory of self-selection in a market with matching frictions: An application to delay in refereeing times in economics journals

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A matching market with imperfect information is studied. With imperfect information, it is shown that friction in a meeting process can facilitate self-selection and thus may improve the matching outcome. As an application, the effect of delay in refereeing time on publication outcome is analyzed in a publication process in economics journals. Though the delay causes efficiency loss by postponing the dissemination of new research, it will better sort the papers to each journal by their qualities by preventing mediocre papers from being submitted to a prestigious journal and published by luck. If an assortative outcome (good papers in prestigious journals and mediocre papers in less prestigious journals) is efficient, the delay may actually improve the publication outcome. Other matching market examples are also discussed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)344-360
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Oct 1
Externally publishedYes


ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
  • Economics and Econometrics

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