An enhanced (t,n) threshold directed signature scheme

Jung Yeon Hwang, Hyong Joong Kim, Dong Hoon Lee, Boyeon Song

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A directed signature scheme is devised to achieve directivity for verification such that only a designated verifier can check the validity of a signature and, in times of trouble, any third party can verify the signature with the help of the signer or the designated verifier. A threshold directed signature scheme distributes responsibility and authority for generating a directed signature to several users via a threshold mechanism. Lu et al. recently proposed a novel (t,n) threshold directed signature scheme. In this paper, we show that the scheme is vulnerable to a rogue-key attack which is mounted by an adversary who can arbitrarily select his or her public key. Through the rogue-key attack, the adversary can forge a signature on any message for a set of signers. In order to thwart such a rogue-key attack, we propose an enhanced (t,n) threshold directed signature scheme with a reliable key registration protocol. The protocol guarantees that a user should have access to the secret key corresponding to the user's public key. Under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, we prove that the improved scheme is secure, that is, it achieves existential unforgeability under the chosen message attack, invisibility, and transitivity in the registered key model. We stress that the security of our improved scheme does not depend on a specific broadcast channel for synchronous message transmission.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)284-292
Number of pages9
JournalInformation Sciences
Volume275
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Aug 10

Fingerprint

Signature Scheme
Network protocols
Signature
Attack
Public key
Broadcast Channel
Diffie-Hellman
Transitivity
Registration
Verify

Keywords

  • Designated verifier
  • Directed signature
  • Forgery
  • Rogue-key attack
  • Threshold

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Information Systems and Management

Cite this

An enhanced (t,n) threshold directed signature scheme. / Hwang, Jung Yeon; Kim, Hyong Joong; Lee, Dong Hoon; Song, Boyeon.

In: Information Sciences, Vol. 275, 10.08.2014, p. 284-292.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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