Collusion attacks to tanaka's corrected ID-based non-interactive key sharing scheme

ik rae Jeong, Jeong Ok Kwon, Dong Hoon Lee

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In 2006, Tanaka has proposed an efficient variant of Maurer-Yacobi's identity-based non-interactive key sharing scheme. In Tanaka's scheme, the computational complexity to generate each user's secret information is much smaller than that of Maurer-Yacobi's scheme. Tanaka's original key sharing scheme does not provide completeness, and so Tanaka has corrected the original scheme to provide completeness. In this paper, we show that Tanaka's corrected key sharing scheme is not secure against collusion attacks. That is, two users can collaborate to factorize a system modulus with their secret information and thus break the key sharing scheme.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)932-934
Number of pages3
JournalIEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
VolumeE92-A
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Dec 1

Fingerprint

Collusion Attack
Identity-based
Computational complexity
Sharing
Completeness
Factorise
Modulus
Computational Complexity

Keywords

  • Collusion attacks
  • Identity-based cryptosystem
  • Non-interactive key sharing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
  • Applied Mathematics
  • Signal Processing

Cite this

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