Coordinating under incomplete information

Geir B. Asheim, Seung Han Yoo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We show that, in a minimum effort game with incomplete information where player types are independently drawn, there is a largest and smallest Bayesian equilibrium, leading to the set of equilibrium payoffs (as evaluated at the interim stage) having a lattice structure. Furthermore, the range of equilibrium payoffs converges to those of the deterministic complete information version of the game, in the limit as the incomplete information vanishes. This entails that such incomplete information alone cannot explain the equilibrium selection suggested by experimental evidence.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)293-313
Number of pages21
JournalReview of Economic Design
Volume12
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008 Dec 1
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Incomplete information
Equilibrium selection
Complete information
Bayesian equilibrium
Games with incomplete information

Keywords

  • Coordination games
  • Incomplete information
  • Minimum effort games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Coordinating under incomplete information. / Asheim, Geir B.; Yoo, Seung Han.

In: Review of Economic Design, Vol. 12, No. 4, 01.12.2008, p. 293-313.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Asheim, Geir B. ; Yoo, Seung Han. / Coordinating under incomplete information. In: Review of Economic Design. 2008 ; Vol. 12, No. 4. pp. 293-313.
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