Coordinating under incomplete information

Geir B. Asheim, Seung Han Yoo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We show that, in a minimum effort game with incomplete information where player types are independently drawn, there is a largest and smallest Bayesian equilibrium, leading to the set of equilibrium payoffs (as evaluated at the interim stage) having a lattice structure. Furthermore, the range of equilibrium payoffs converges to those of the deterministic complete information version of the game, in the limit as the incomplete information vanishes. This entails that such incomplete information alone cannot explain the equilibrium selection suggested by experimental evidence.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)293-313
Number of pages21
JournalReview of Economic Design
Volume12
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008 Dec 1
Externally publishedYes

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Keywords

  • Coordination games
  • Incomplete information
  • Minimum effort games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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