Abstract
In ICICS'02, Byun et al. presented a new client to client password-authenticated key exchange(C2C-PAKE) protocol in a crossrealm setting. In their paper, they argued that their C2C-PAKE protocol is secure against the Denning-Sacco attack of an insider adversary. In this paper, we show that, contrary to their arguments, the C2C-PAKE protocol is vulnerable to the Denning-Sacco attack by an insider adversary. And we also present the modified protocol to solve this problem.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 895-902 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
Volume | 3043 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2004 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Theoretical Computer Science
- Computer Science(all)