Differential power analysis on countermeasures using binary signed digit representations

Tae Hyun Kim, Dong Guk Han, Katsuyuki Okeya, Jongin Lim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)


Side channel attacks are a very serious menace to embedded devices with cryptographic applications. To counteract such attacks many randomization techniques have been proposed. One efficient technique in elliptic curve cryptosystems randomizes addition chains with binary signed digit (BSD) representations of the secret key. However, when such countermeasures have been used alone, most of them have been broken by various simple power analysis attacks. In this paper, we consider combinations which can enhance the security of countermeasures using BSD representations by adding additional countermeasures. First, we propose several ways the improved countermeasures based on BSD representations can be attacked. In an actual statistical power analysis attack, the number of samples plays an important role. Therefore, we estimate the number of samples needed in the proposed attack.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)619-632
Number of pages14
JournalETRI Journal
Issue number5
Publication statusPublished - 2007 Oct


  • Binary signed digit representation
  • Elliptic curve cryptosystems
  • Side channel attacks
  • Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
  • Smart card

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electronic, Optical and Magnetic Materials
  • Computer Science(all)
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering


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