Differential power analysis on countermeasures using binary signed digit representations

Tae Hyun Kim, Dong Guk Han, Katsuyuki Okeya, Jong In Lim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Side channel attacks are a very serious menace to embedded devices with cryptographic applications. To counteract such attacks many randomization techniques have been proposed. One efficient technique in elliptic curve cryptosystems randomizes addition chains with binary signed digit (BSD) representations of the secret key. However, when such countermeasures have been used alone, most of them have been broken by various simple power analysis attacks. In this paper, we consider combinations which can enhance the security of countermeasures using BSD representations by adding additional countermeasures. First, we propose several ways the improved countermeasures based on BSD representations can be attacked. In an actual statistical power analysis attack, the number of samples plays an important role. Therefore, we estimate the number of samples needed in the proposed attack.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)619-632
Number of pages14
JournalETRI Journal
Volume29
Issue number5
Publication statusPublished - 2007 Oct 1

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Cryptography
Side channel attack

Keywords

  • Binary signed digit representation
  • Elliptic curve cryptosystems
  • Side channel attacks
  • Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
  • Smart card

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Differential power analysis on countermeasures using binary signed digit representations. / Kim, Tae Hyun; Han, Dong Guk; Okeya, Katsuyuki; Lim, Jong In.

In: ETRI Journal, Vol. 29, No. 5, 01.10.2007, p. 619-632.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Kim, Tae Hyun ; Han, Dong Guk ; Okeya, Katsuyuki ; Lim, Jong In. / Differential power analysis on countermeasures using binary signed digit representations. In: ETRI Journal. 2007 ; Vol. 29, No. 5. pp. 619-632.
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