Abstract
Implantable medical devices (IMDs) continuously monitor the condition of a patient and directly apply treatments if considered necessary. Because IMDs are highly effective for patients who frequently visit hospitals (e.g., because of chronic illnesses such as diabetes and heart disease), their use is increasing significantly. However, related security concerns have also come to the fore. It has been demonstrated that IMDs can be hacked - the IMD power can be turned off remotely, and abnormally large doses of drugs can be injected into the body. Thus, IMDs may ultimately threaten a patient's life. In this paper, we propose an energy-aware key exchange protocol for securing IMDs. We utilize synchronous interpulse intervals (IPIs) as the source of a secret key. These IPIs enable IMDs to agree upon a secret key with an external programmer in an authenticated and transparent manner without any key material being exposed either before distribution or during initialization. We demonstrate that it is difficult for adversaries to guess the keys established using our method. In addition, we show that the reduced communication overhead of our method enhances battery life, making the proposed approach more energy-efficient than previous methods.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 1809302 |
| Journal | Security and Communication Networks |
| Volume | 2018 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2018 Jan 1 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Information Systems
- Computer Networks and Communications
Cite this
Energy-aware key exchange for securing implantable medical devices. / Choi, Wonsuk; Lee, Youngkyung; Lee, Duhyeong; Kim, Hyoseung; Park, Jin Hyung; Kim, In-Seok; Lee, Dong Hoon.
In: Security and Communication Networks, Vol. 2018, 1809302, 01.01.2018.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Energy-aware key exchange for securing implantable medical devices
AU - Choi, Wonsuk
AU - Lee, Youngkyung
AU - Lee, Duhyeong
AU - Kim, Hyoseung
AU - Park, Jin Hyung
AU - Kim, In-Seok
AU - Lee, Dong Hoon
PY - 2018/1/1
Y1 - 2018/1/1
N2 - Implantable medical devices (IMDs) continuously monitor the condition of a patient and directly apply treatments if considered necessary. Because IMDs are highly effective for patients who frequently visit hospitals (e.g., because of chronic illnesses such as diabetes and heart disease), their use is increasing significantly. However, related security concerns have also come to the fore. It has been demonstrated that IMDs can be hacked - the IMD power can be turned off remotely, and abnormally large doses of drugs can be injected into the body. Thus, IMDs may ultimately threaten a patient's life. In this paper, we propose an energy-aware key exchange protocol for securing IMDs. We utilize synchronous interpulse intervals (IPIs) as the source of a secret key. These IPIs enable IMDs to agree upon a secret key with an external programmer in an authenticated and transparent manner without any key material being exposed either before distribution or during initialization. We demonstrate that it is difficult for adversaries to guess the keys established using our method. In addition, we show that the reduced communication overhead of our method enhances battery life, making the proposed approach more energy-efficient than previous methods.
AB - Implantable medical devices (IMDs) continuously monitor the condition of a patient and directly apply treatments if considered necessary. Because IMDs are highly effective for patients who frequently visit hospitals (e.g., because of chronic illnesses such as diabetes and heart disease), their use is increasing significantly. However, related security concerns have also come to the fore. It has been demonstrated that IMDs can be hacked - the IMD power can be turned off remotely, and abnormally large doses of drugs can be injected into the body. Thus, IMDs may ultimately threaten a patient's life. In this paper, we propose an energy-aware key exchange protocol for securing IMDs. We utilize synchronous interpulse intervals (IPIs) as the source of a secret key. These IPIs enable IMDs to agree upon a secret key with an external programmer in an authenticated and transparent manner without any key material being exposed either before distribution or during initialization. We demonstrate that it is difficult for adversaries to guess the keys established using our method. In addition, we show that the reduced communication overhead of our method enhances battery life, making the proposed approach more energy-efficient than previous methods.
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U2 - 10.1155/2018/1809302
DO - 10.1155/2018/1809302
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85062824170
VL - 2018
JO - Security and Communication Networks
JF - Security and Communication Networks
SN - 1939-0122
M1 - 1809302
ER -