Recently, Lu and Cao proposed a simple three-party password-based key exchange (STPKE) protocol based on the CCDH assumption. They claimed that their protocol is secure, efficient, and practical. In this paper, unlike their claims, we find that the STPKE protocol is still vulnerable to undetectable on-line password guessing attacks by using formal description, BPR model. These weakness is due to the fact that the messages of the communicants are not appropriately encrypted into the exchanged cryptographic messages. To enhance the security of the STPKE protocol, we suggest a countermeasure to resist our described attacks while the merits of the original protocol are left unchanged.
- BPR model
- Password-based key exchange protocol
- Undetectable on-line guessing attack
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Control and Systems Engineering
- Computer Science(all)
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering