Abstract
We consider an asymmetric lottery Blotto game with two agents and n items, where both agents wish to maximize their probability of winning a majority value of all n items. Duffy and Matros [2] showed that if there exists a Nash equilibrium, then the equilibrium is unique, and it is found in an explicit expression. They also provided sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the cases of n=3 and n=4. In this paper, we prove that the lottery Blotto game always has a unique Nash equilibrium for any value of n.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1403-1415 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications |
Volume | 479 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2019 Nov 1 |
Keywords
- Lottery Blotto game
- Nash equilibrium
- Weighted majority
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Analysis
- Applied Mathematics