Abstract
Using a discrete choice experiment with real economic incentives, this paper studies how food fiscal policies and external influences (such as pestering and information) can affect parental choice of food for their child. Using pairs of a parent and child, the experimental design varies the food prices of healthier and unhealthier alternatives of food products for children as part of specific food fiscal policies. We then examine the interplay of children's pester power as well as information about the fiscal policies. The results from our lab experiment suggest that (a) implementing a fat tax and a subsidy simultaneously can shift parental behavior to healthier food products to a greater degree than a fat tax or a subsidy alone, (b) providing information regarding the food fiscal policies can further increase the impact of the intervention, and (c) child pestering is one of the causes of the moderate effectiveness of the policies as it strongly affects parents in making unhealthier choices.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 196-208 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
| Volume | 117 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2015 Sep 1 |
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Keywords
- Choice experiment
- Fat tax
- Information
- Pester power
- Subsidy
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
Fat tax, subsidy or both? The role of information and children's pester power in food choice. / Papoutsi, Georgia S.; Nayga, Jr, Rodolfo M.; Lazaridis, Panagiotis; Drichoutis, Andreas C.
In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 117, 01.09.2015, p. 196-208.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Fat tax, subsidy or both? The role of information and children's pester power in food choice
AU - Papoutsi, Georgia S.
AU - Nayga, Jr, Rodolfo M.
AU - Lazaridis, Panagiotis
AU - Drichoutis, Andreas C.
PY - 2015/9/1
Y1 - 2015/9/1
N2 - Using a discrete choice experiment with real economic incentives, this paper studies how food fiscal policies and external influences (such as pestering and information) can affect parental choice of food for their child. Using pairs of a parent and child, the experimental design varies the food prices of healthier and unhealthier alternatives of food products for children as part of specific food fiscal policies. We then examine the interplay of children's pester power as well as information about the fiscal policies. The results from our lab experiment suggest that (a) implementing a fat tax and a subsidy simultaneously can shift parental behavior to healthier food products to a greater degree than a fat tax or a subsidy alone, (b) providing information regarding the food fiscal policies can further increase the impact of the intervention, and (c) child pestering is one of the causes of the moderate effectiveness of the policies as it strongly affects parents in making unhealthier choices.
AB - Using a discrete choice experiment with real economic incentives, this paper studies how food fiscal policies and external influences (such as pestering and information) can affect parental choice of food for their child. Using pairs of a parent and child, the experimental design varies the food prices of healthier and unhealthier alternatives of food products for children as part of specific food fiscal policies. We then examine the interplay of children's pester power as well as information about the fiscal policies. The results from our lab experiment suggest that (a) implementing a fat tax and a subsidy simultaneously can shift parental behavior to healthier food products to a greater degree than a fat tax or a subsidy alone, (b) providing information regarding the food fiscal policies can further increase the impact of the intervention, and (c) child pestering is one of the causes of the moderate effectiveness of the policies as it strongly affects parents in making unhealthier choices.
KW - Choice experiment
KW - Fat tax
KW - Information
KW - Pester power
KW - Subsidy
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84936939698&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84936939698&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.06.011
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.06.011
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84936939698
VL - 117
SP - 196
EP - 208
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
SN - 0167-2681
ER -