Fault tree construction of hybrid system requirements using qualitative formal method

Jang S. Lee, Sungdeok Cha

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

When specifying requirements for software controlling hybrid systems and conducting safety analysis, engineers experience that requirements are often known only in qualitative terms and that existing fault tree analysis techniques provide little guidance on formulating and evaluating potential failure modes. In this paper, we propose Causal Requirements Safety Analysis (CRSA) as a technique to qualitatively evaluate causal relationship between software faults and physical hazards. This technique, extending qualitative formal method process and utilizing information captured in the state trajectory, provides specific guidelines on how to identify failure modes and relationship among them. Using a simplified electrical power system as an example, we describe step-by-step procedures of conducting CRSA. Our experience of applying CRSA to perform fault tree analysis on requirements for the Wolsong nuclear power plant shutdown system indicates that CRSA is an effective technique in assisting safety engineers.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)121-131
Number of pages11
JournalReliability Engineering and System Safety
Volume87
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2005 Jan 1
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Qualitative Methods
Safety Analysis
Fault Tree
Formal methods
Formal Methods
Hybrid systems
Requirements Analysis
Hybrid Systems
Requirements
Fault Tree Analysis
Failure Mode
Fault tree analysis
Failure modes
Software
Nuclear Power Plant
Engineers
Plant shutdowns
Hazard
Power System
Guidance

Keywords

  • Fault tree
  • Formal method
  • Hybrid system
  • Requirements
  • Software safety

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Mechanical Engineering
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

Cite this

Fault tree construction of hybrid system requirements using qualitative formal method. / Lee, Jang S.; Cha, Sungdeok.

In: Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 87, No. 1, 01.01.2005, p. 121-131.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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