First-order side channel attacks on Zhang's countermeasures

Heeseok Kim, Dong Guk Han, Seokhie Hong

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Zhang's three countermeasures are known to be secure against certain first-order side channel attacks such as differential power analysis and correlation power analysis. This security comes from the countermeasures' use of random points to blind the message and random integers to blind the secret scalar. In this paper, we propose first-order side channel attack methods that can perfectly break these three countermeasures. Even though Zhang's countermeasures use random points and random integers our attacks are made possible by the fact that intermediate values computed by these countermeasures are dependent on specific values that we can guess. The experimental results verify that the proposed attack methods can successfully break existing countermeasures.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)4051-4060
Number of pages10
JournalInformation Sciences
Volume181
Issue number18
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011 Sep 15

Fingerprint

Side Channel Attacks
Countermeasures
First-order
Attack
Differential Power Analysis
Power Analysis
Integer
Correlation Analysis
Guess
Side channel attack
Scalar
Verify
Dependent
Experimental Results

Keywords

  • Countermeasure
  • Differential power analysis
  • Elliptic curve
  • Scalar multiplication
  • Side channel attacks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Information Systems and Management

Cite this

First-order side channel attacks on Zhang's countermeasures. / Kim, Heeseok; Han, Dong Guk; Hong, Seokhie.

In: Information Sciences, Vol. 181, No. 18, 15.09.2011, p. 4051-4060.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Kim, Heeseok ; Han, Dong Guk ; Hong, Seokhie. / First-order side channel attacks on Zhang's countermeasures. In: Information Sciences. 2011 ; Vol. 181, No. 18. pp. 4051-4060.
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