Forgery and key recovery attacks on PMAC and Mitchell's TMAC variant

Changhoon Lee, Jongsung Kim, Jaechul Sung, Seokhie Hong, Sangjin Lee

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we discuss the security of PMAC, a provably secure and parallelizable MAC scheme proposed by Black and Rogaway, and Michell's TMAC variant, proposed to improve the security of TMAC. We show how to devise forgery attacks on PMAC and compare the success rate of our forgery attacks with their security bound. We also present forgery attacks on TMAC variant and show the security of TMAC variant is not improved in the sense of the forgery attack. Furthermore, key recovery attacks on PMAC and TMAC variant are presented in various parameters. Our results imply they have no significant advantage in comparison with other well-established MAC schemes.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInformation Security and Privacy
Subtitle of host publication11th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2006, Proceedings
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages421-431
Number of pages11
ISBN (Print)3540354581, 9783540354581
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2006
Event11th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2006 - Melbourne, Australia
Duration: 2006 Jul 32006 Jul 5

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume4058 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other11th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2006
CountryAustralia
CityMelbourne
Period06/7/306/7/5

Keywords

  • CBC-MAC
  • Forgery Attacks
  • Key Recovery Attacks
  • MAC (Message Authentication Code)
  • PMAC
  • TMAC Variant

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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  • Cite this

    Lee, C., Kim, J., Sung, J., Hong, S., & Lee, S. (2006). Forgery and key recovery attacks on PMAC and Mitchell's TMAC variant. In Information Security and Privacy: 11th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2006, Proceedings (pp. 421-431). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 4058 LNCS). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11780656_35