Generic cryptanalysis of combined countermeasures with randomized BSD representations

Tae Hyun Kim, Dong G. Han, Katsuyuki Okeya, Jong In Lim

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In ICICS'04, Sim et al. proposed an attack against the full version of Ha-Moon's countermeasure which is one of enhanced counter-measures. The analysis technique is based on the fact that the probability for the appearance of an intermediate value is p = 1/2. By our simulations, however, it is proven to be not true. Thus sometimes the output of their attack might be wrong because there exists the case that the probability p is so small that they can make a wrong decision. In this paper we repair the above attack, and then propose a generic analytical technique applicable to all BSD type countermeasures combined with some simple power analysis countermeasures. In order to show that the proposed attack is as practical as the usual differential power analysis (DPA), we estimate the number of samples and computational cost. Furthermore, we enhance the proposed attack in two ways such that it works against right-to-left algorithm in a simpler and more efficient way, and also works against one combined with an extra DPA countermeasure.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Pages119-134
Number of pages16
Volume3928 LNCS
Publication statusPublished - 2006 Jul 14
Event7th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 International Conference, CARDIS 2006 - Tarargona, Spain
Duration: 2006 Apr 192006 Apr 21

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume3928 LNCS
ISSN (Print)03029743
ISSN (Electronic)16113349

Other

Other7th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 International Conference, CARDIS 2006
CountrySpain
CityTarargona
Period06/4/1906/4/21

Fingerprint

Cryptanalysis
Countermeasures
Attack
Differential Power Analysis
Moon
Repair
Costs and Cost Analysis
Power Analysis
Costs
Computational Cost
Output
Estimate
Simulation

Keywords

  • Binary Signed Digit (BSD) Representation
  • Differential Power Analysis
  • Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
  • Refined Power Analysis
  • Side Channel Attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Computer Science(all)
  • Theoretical Computer Science

Cite this

Kim, T. H., Han, D. G., Okeya, K., & Lim, J. I. (2006). Generic cryptanalysis of combined countermeasures with randomized BSD representations. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 3928 LNCS, pp. 119-134). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 3928 LNCS).

Generic cryptanalysis of combined countermeasures with randomized BSD representations. / Kim, Tae Hyun; Han, Dong G.; Okeya, Katsuyuki; Lim, Jong In.

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). Vol. 3928 LNCS 2006. p. 119-134 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 3928 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Kim, TH, Han, DG, Okeya, K & Lim, JI 2006, Generic cryptanalysis of combined countermeasures with randomized BSD representations. in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). vol. 3928 LNCS, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 3928 LNCS, pp. 119-134, 7th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 International Conference, CARDIS 2006, Tarargona, Spain, 06/4/19.
Kim TH, Han DG, Okeya K, Lim JI. Generic cryptanalysis of combined countermeasures with randomized BSD representations. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). Vol. 3928 LNCS. 2006. p. 119-134. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
Kim, Tae Hyun ; Han, Dong G. ; Okeya, Katsuyuki ; Lim, Jong In. / Generic cryptanalysis of combined countermeasures with randomized BSD representations. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). Vol. 3928 LNCS 2006. pp. 119-134 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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