ID-based authenticated group key agreement secure against insider attacks

Kyu Young Choi, Jung Yeon Hwang, Dong Hoon Lee

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In 2004, Choi et al. proposed an ID-based authenticated group key agreement. Unfortunately, their protoc'ol was found to be vulnerable to the insider attacks by Zhang, Chen and Shim. To prevent insider attacks, Shim presented a modification of Choi et al.'s protocol. In this letter, we first show that Shim's modification is still insecure against insider attacks. We then present a modification of Choi et al.'s protocol that resists insider attacks. The counter-measure uses an ID-based signature on transcripts in order to bind them in a session. This prevents any replay of transcripts. Especially, by applying ID-based batch verification, the proposed one still consists of two rounds and is computationally efficient.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1828-1830
Number of pages3
JournalIEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
VolumeE91-A
Issue number7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008 Dec 1

Fingerprint

Group Key Agreement
Shims
Identity-based
Attack
Network protocols
Countermeasures
Resist
Batch
Signature

Keywords

  • Authenticated group key agreement
  • ID-based cryptography
  • Insider attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
  • Applied Mathematics
  • Signal Processing

Cite this

ID-based authenticated group key agreement secure against insider attacks. / Choi, Kyu Young; Hwang, Jung Yeon; Lee, Dong Hoon.

In: IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences, Vol. E91-A, No. 7, 01.12.2008, p. 1828-1830.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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