Abstract
In 2004, Choi et al. proposed an ID-based authenticated group key agreement. Unfortunately, their protoc'ol was found to be vulnerable to the insider attacks by Zhang, Chen and Shim. To prevent insider attacks, Shim presented a modification of Choi et al.'s protocol. In this letter, we first show that Shim's modification is still insecure against insider attacks. We then present a modification of Choi et al.'s protocol that resists insider attacks. The counter-measure uses an ID-based signature on transcripts in order to bind them in a session. This prevents any replay of transcripts. Especially, by applying ID-based batch verification, the proposed one still consists of two rounds and is computationally efficient.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1828-1830 |
| Number of pages | 3 |
| Journal | IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences |
| Volume | E91-A |
| Issue number | 7 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2008 |
Keywords
- Authenticated group key agreement
- ID-based cryptography
- Insider attack
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Signal Processing
- Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- Applied Mathematics
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Cite this
Choi, K. Y., Hwang, J. Y., & Lee, D. H. (2008). ID-based authenticated group key agreement secure against insider attacks. IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences, E91-A(7), 1828-1830. https://doi.org/10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.7.1828