Abstract
In 2004, Choi et al. proposed an ID-based authenticated group key agreement. Unfortunately, their protoc'ol was found to be vulnerable to the insider attacks by Zhang, Chen and Shim. To prevent insider attacks, Shim presented a modification of Choi et al.'s protocol. In this letter, we first show that Shim's modification is still insecure against insider attacks. We then present a modification of Choi et al.'s protocol that resists insider attacks. The counter-measure uses an ID-based signature on transcripts in order to bind them in a session. This prevents any replay of transcripts. Especially, by applying ID-based batch verification, the proposed one still consists of two rounds and is computationally efficient.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1828-1830 |
| Number of pages | 3 |
| Journal | IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences |
| Volume | E91-A |
| Issue number | 7 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2008 Dec 1 |
Fingerprint
Keywords
- Authenticated group key agreement
- ID-based cryptography
- Insider attack
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
- Applied Mathematics
- Signal Processing
Cite this
ID-based authenticated group key agreement secure against insider attacks. / Choi, Kyu Young; Hwang, Jung Yeon; Lee, Dong Hoon.
In: IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences, Vol. E91-A, No. 7, 01.12.2008, p. 1828-1830.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - ID-based authenticated group key agreement secure against insider attacks
AU - Choi, Kyu Young
AU - Hwang, Jung Yeon
AU - Lee, Dong Hoon
PY - 2008/12/1
Y1 - 2008/12/1
N2 - In 2004, Choi et al. proposed an ID-based authenticated group key agreement. Unfortunately, their protoc'ol was found to be vulnerable to the insider attacks by Zhang, Chen and Shim. To prevent insider attacks, Shim presented a modification of Choi et al.'s protocol. In this letter, we first show that Shim's modification is still insecure against insider attacks. We then present a modification of Choi et al.'s protocol that resists insider attacks. The counter-measure uses an ID-based signature on transcripts in order to bind them in a session. This prevents any replay of transcripts. Especially, by applying ID-based batch verification, the proposed one still consists of two rounds and is computationally efficient.
AB - In 2004, Choi et al. proposed an ID-based authenticated group key agreement. Unfortunately, their protoc'ol was found to be vulnerable to the insider attacks by Zhang, Chen and Shim. To prevent insider attacks, Shim presented a modification of Choi et al.'s protocol. In this letter, we first show that Shim's modification is still insecure against insider attacks. We then present a modification of Choi et al.'s protocol that resists insider attacks. The counter-measure uses an ID-based signature on transcripts in order to bind them in a session. This prevents any replay of transcripts. Especially, by applying ID-based batch verification, the proposed one still consists of two rounds and is computationally efficient.
KW - Authenticated group key agreement
KW - ID-based cryptography
KW - Insider attack
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77951282858&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=77951282858&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.7.1828
DO - 10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.7.1828
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:77951282858
VL - E91-A
SP - 1828
EP - 1830
JO - IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
JF - IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
SN - 0916-8508
IS - 7
ER -