Improved differential fault analysis on lightweight block cipher LBlock for wireless sensor networks

Kitae Jeong, Changhoon Lee, Jong In Lim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

LBlock is a 64-bit lightweight block cipher which can be implemented in both constrained hardware environments, such as wireless sensor network, and software platforms. In this paper, we study the security of LBlock against a differential fault analysis. Based on a random nibble fault model, we propose two versions of the attack on LBlock. In the first attack, we inject random nibble faults to the input register of round 29. As a result, it can recover the secret key of LBlock using an exhaustive search of 225 and five random nibble fault injections on average. This attack can be simulated on a general PC within a few seconds. In the case of second attack, random nibble faults are induced to the input register of round 30. This attack can recover the secret key of LBlock using an exhaustive search of 230 and seven random nibble fault injection on average. This attack can be simulated on a general PC within 1 h. These results are superior to known differential fault analytic result on LBlock.

Original languageEnglish
Article number151
JournalEurasip Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
Volume2013
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013 Dec

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Wireless sensor networks
Hardware
Side channel attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Signal Processing
  • Computer Science Applications

Cite this

Improved differential fault analysis on lightweight block cipher LBlock for wireless sensor networks. / Jeong, Kitae; Lee, Changhoon; Lim, Jong In.

In: Eurasip Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking, Vol. 2013, No. 1, 151, 12.2013.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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