Improving food choices among supplemental nutrition assistance program recipients

Wen You, Paul D. Mitchell, Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We used a principal-agent framework to examine the feasibility of two proposed modifications to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program with the goal of encouraging healthier food choices among program participants. Specifically, we analyzed two types of contract: a restricted contract and an incentive contract. The restricted contract did not allow the purchase of unhealthy foods with program benefits, but compensated participants by increasing total benefits. The incentive contract provided increased benefits that varied according to the percentage of healthy foods purchased with program benefits. The theoretical results revealed the mechanisms for the two alternative contracts, the conditions under which each would be effective, and the key empirical questions to be examined for future policy analysis.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)852-864
Number of pages13
JournalHealth Economics (United Kingdom)
Volume21
Issue number7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012 Jul 1
Externally publishedYes

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Food Assistance
Contracts
Food
Motivation
Policy Making

Keywords

  • Contract theory
  • Food choices
  • Principal-agent
  • SNAP

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Health Policy

Cite this

Improving food choices among supplemental nutrition assistance program recipients. / You, Wen; Mitchell, Paul D.; Nayga, Jr, Rodolfo M.

In: Health Economics (United Kingdom), Vol. 21, No. 7, 01.07.2012, p. 852-864.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

You, Wen ; Mitchell, Paul D. ; Nayga, Jr, Rodolfo M. / Improving food choices among supplemental nutrition assistance program recipients. In: Health Economics (United Kingdom). 2012 ; Vol. 21, No. 7. pp. 852-864.
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