Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study three incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms: (i) strategy-proofness, which requires that no agent gain by misrepresenting his preferences; (ii) adjacent strategy-proofness, which requires that no agent gain by switching the rankings of two adjacent alternatives; and (iii) mistake monotonicity, which requires that the welfare of each agent weakly decrease as he reports increasingly bigger mistakes. Each of these properties has three versions, depending on whether preferences over sure alternatives are extended to preferences over lotteries by the stochastic dominance, downward lexicographic, or upward lexicographic extension. We identify conditions on the preference domain that guarantee the equivalence of these properties. The universal domain and the domains of single-dipped and single-peaked preferences satisfy our conditions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)168-177
Number of pages10
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume95
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016 Jan 1
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Incentives
Strategy-proofness
Monotonicity
Single-peaked preferences
Guarantee
Stochastic dominance
Equivalence
Ranking
Lottery

Keywords

  • Adjacent strategy-proofness
  • Mistake monotonicity
  • Ordinal mechanism
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms. / Cho, Wonki.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 95, 01.01.2016, p. 168-177.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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