Informational disadvantage and bargaining power

Sung Hyuk Ko, Byoung Heon Jun

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We consider an alternating offer model where the size of the to-tal surplus is stochastic. Furthermore, the size changes during the time when the offer is being considered. As a result the responder may obtain more information than the proposer. We analyze how the asymmetry in ability to access good information affects the bargaining power, both in terms of the resulting share and in terms of the delay in agreement.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)9-19
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
Volume20
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Mar 1

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Keywords

  • Alternating offer bargaining
  • Informational advantage
  • Stochastic surplus

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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