TY - JOUR
T1 - Jumping the curse
T2 - Early contracting with private information in university admissions
AU - Lee, Sam Ho
PY - 2009/2
Y1 - 2009/2
N2 - This article introduces a new model of early contracting. Employers who have private information about the applicant's ability worry that applicants who accept their offer are precisely those who were not offered other jobs. To avoid this winner's curse, employers anticipate the time of contracting. The model is developed in the context of university admissions, and is shown to be consistent with several stylized facts in that "market." We show that, in contrast to received wisdom, allocative efficiency may be improved by the presence of early contracting.
AB - This article introduces a new model of early contracting. Employers who have private information about the applicant's ability worry that applicants who accept their offer are precisely those who were not offered other jobs. To avoid this winner's curse, employers anticipate the time of contracting. The model is developed in the context of university admissions, and is shown to be consistent with several stylized facts in that "market." We show that, in contrast to received wisdom, allocative efficiency may be improved by the presence of early contracting.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=58849104967&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00522.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00522.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:58849104967
SN - 0020-6598
VL - 50
SP - 1
EP - 38
JO - International Economic Review
JF - International Economic Review
IS - 1
ER -