Learning a population distribution

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper introduces a dynamic Bayesian game with an unknown population distribution. Players do not know the true population distribution and assess it based on their private observations using Bayes' rule. First, we show the existence and characterization of an equilibrium in which each player's strategy is a function not only of the player's type but also of experience. Second, we show that each player's initial belief about the population distribution converges almost surely to a "correct" belief.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)188-201
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Volume48
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Jan 1

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Population distribution
Bayes Rule
Game
Converge
Unknown
Learning
Beliefs

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Learning a population distribution. / Yoo, Seung Han.

In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 48, 01.01.2014, p. 188-201.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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