Market selection with endogenous information revelation

Scott Condie; Seung Han Yoo

doi:10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00159.x

Market selection with endogenous information revelation

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper uses the dynamic general equilibrium model developed by Mailath and Sandroni (2003) but allows information revelation to be determined endogenously. The paper establishes sufficient conditions on the exogenous information arrival process that ensure that an investor who receives unique information infinitely often drives out an investor who receives unique information only finitely often.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	201-215
Number of pages	15
Journal	International Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	7
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00159.x
Publication status	Published - 2011 Jun
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Learning
Market selection
Rational expectations

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00159.x

Cite this

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Market selection with endogenous information revelation

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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