Measuring effort incentives in a tournament with many participants

Theory and application

Chirok Han, Changhui Kang, Sam-Ho Lee

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This article provides an empirical measure to compare incentive effects of different tournament structures. Although there have been many theoretical attempts to analyze incentive effects of a tournament competition, empirical applications are limited as the provided conditions cannot easily be empirically observed. We show that the empirical density of the performance distribution can be used to measure effort incentives in a tournament with many participants. We apply this method to evaluate the grading policy change in the 2008 College Scholastic Ability Test in South Korea.

Original languageEnglish
JournalEconomic Inquiry
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2015

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Incentives
Tournament
Incentive effect
South Korea
Grading
Policy change

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)

Cite this

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abstract = "This article provides an empirical measure to compare incentive effects of different tournament structures. Although there have been many theoretical attempts to analyze incentive effects of a tournament competition, empirical applications are limited as the provided conditions cannot easily be empirically observed. We show that the empirical density of the performance distribution can be used to measure effort incentives in a tournament with many participants. We apply this method to evaluate the grading policy change in the 2008 College Scholastic Ability Test in South Korea.",
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