Abstract
We consider the problem of password-authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange among N parties, N-1 clients and a single-server, using different passwords. Most password-authenticated key exchange schemes in the literature have focused on an authenticated key exchange using a shared password between a client and a server. With a rapid change in modern communication environment such as ad-hoc networks and ubiquitous computing, it is necessary to construct a secure end-to-end channel between clients, which is a quite different paradigm from the existing ones. To achieve this end-to-end security, only a few schemes of three-party setting have been presented where two clients exchange a key using their own passwords with the help of a server. However, up until now, no formally treated and round efficient protocols which enable group members to generate a common session key with clients' distinct passwords have been suggested. In this paper we securely and efficiently extend three-party case to N-party case with a formal proof of security. Two provably secure N-party EKE protocols are suggested; N-party EKE-U in the unicast network and N-party EKE-M in the multicast network. The proposed N-party EKE-M is provable secure and provides forward secrecy. Especially, the scheme is of constant-round, hence scalable and practical.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 75-90 |
Number of pages | 16 |
Journal | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
Volume | 3531 |
Publication status | Published - 2005 |
Event | Third International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security, ACNS 2005 - New York, NY, United States Duration: 2005 Jun 7 → 2005 Jun 10 |
Keywords
- Authenticated key exchange
- Dictionary attacks
- Different password authentication
- Encrypted key exchange
- N-party authentication
- Password
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Theoretical Computer Science
- Computer Science(all)