OMAP: One-way memory attestation protocol for smart meters

Kyoungsub Song, Dongwon Seo, Haemin Park, Heejo Lee, Adrian Perrig

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

25 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A smart meter is one of the key elements of smart girds. An attacker can compromise smart meters by injecting malicious codes, and take financial benefits by modifying memory contents of the smart meters. An attestation scheme can prevent such a memory forgery attack as verifying memory contents. In smart grids, however, attestation processes are remotely performed through networks by a faraway utility. Therefore, attestation processes are exposed to network attacks such as man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Even though existing attestation mechanisms detect local attacks such as the memory forgery, they are vulnerable to network attacks since they adopt a two-way attestation so-called a challenge-response protocol. In this paper, we propose a novel attestation mechanism, termed One-way Memory Attestation Protocol(OMAP), not only to detect local attacks, but also to defend against network attacks. Instead of using the two-way attestation, OMAP adopts an one-way attestation protocol; OMAP conducts a pre-defined internal algorithm, generates a checksum, and sends it to a verifier in one direction. Thus, OMAP does not require any information (e.g., challenges) from a verifier that can be exploitable by an adversary. In our experiments, as a smart meter scans only 0.004% of its memory, OMAP enables a verifier to detect memory modification with 95% probability if an attacker changes 20% of the memory.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications Workshops, ISPAW 2011 - ICASE 2011, SGH 2011, GSDP 2011
Pages111-118
Number of pages8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011 Aug 29
Event9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications Workshops, ISPAW 2011 - 2011, ICASE 2011, SGH 2011, GSDP 2011 - Busan, Korea, Republic of
Duration: 2011 May 262011 May 28

Other

Other9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications Workshops, ISPAW 2011 - 2011, ICASE 2011, SGH 2011, GSDP 2011
CountryKorea, Republic of
CityBusan
Period11/5/2611/5/28

Fingerprint

Smart meters
Data storage equipment

Keywords

  • Smart grid
  • Smart meter
  • Software-based remote attestation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Software

Cite this

Song, K., Seo, D., Park, H., Lee, H., & Perrig, A. (2011). OMAP: One-way memory attestation protocol for smart meters. In Proceedings - 9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications Workshops, ISPAW 2011 - ICASE 2011, SGH 2011, GSDP 2011 (pp. 111-118). [5951959] https://doi.org/10.1109/ISPAW.2011.37

OMAP : One-way memory attestation protocol for smart meters. / Song, Kyoungsub; Seo, Dongwon; Park, Haemin; Lee, Heejo; Perrig, Adrian.

Proceedings - 9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications Workshops, ISPAW 2011 - ICASE 2011, SGH 2011, GSDP 2011. 2011. p. 111-118 5951959.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Song, K, Seo, D, Park, H, Lee, H & Perrig, A 2011, OMAP: One-way memory attestation protocol for smart meters. in Proceedings - 9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications Workshops, ISPAW 2011 - ICASE 2011, SGH 2011, GSDP 2011., 5951959, pp. 111-118, 9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications Workshops, ISPAW 2011 - 2011, ICASE 2011, SGH 2011, GSDP 2011, Busan, Korea, Republic of, 11/5/26. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISPAW.2011.37
Song K, Seo D, Park H, Lee H, Perrig A. OMAP: One-way memory attestation protocol for smart meters. In Proceedings - 9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications Workshops, ISPAW 2011 - ICASE 2011, SGH 2011, GSDP 2011. 2011. p. 111-118. 5951959 https://doi.org/10.1109/ISPAW.2011.37
Song, Kyoungsub ; Seo, Dongwon ; Park, Haemin ; Lee, Heejo ; Perrig, Adrian. / OMAP : One-way memory attestation protocol for smart meters. Proceedings - 9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications Workshops, ISPAW 2011 - ICASE 2011, SGH 2011, GSDP 2011. 2011. pp. 111-118
@inproceedings{7ad217c82fca4f3797024f2fe9a03cb2,
title = "OMAP: One-way memory attestation protocol for smart meters",
abstract = "A smart meter is one of the key elements of smart girds. An attacker can compromise smart meters by injecting malicious codes, and take financial benefits by modifying memory contents of the smart meters. An attestation scheme can prevent such a memory forgery attack as verifying memory contents. In smart grids, however, attestation processes are remotely performed through networks by a faraway utility. Therefore, attestation processes are exposed to network attacks such as man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Even though existing attestation mechanisms detect local attacks such as the memory forgery, they are vulnerable to network attacks since they adopt a two-way attestation so-called a challenge-response protocol. In this paper, we propose a novel attestation mechanism, termed One-way Memory Attestation Protocol(OMAP), not only to detect local attacks, but also to defend against network attacks. Instead of using the two-way attestation, OMAP adopts an one-way attestation protocol; OMAP conducts a pre-defined internal algorithm, generates a checksum, and sends it to a verifier in one direction. Thus, OMAP does not require any information (e.g., challenges) from a verifier that can be exploitable by an adversary. In our experiments, as a smart meter scans only 0.004{\%} of its memory, OMAP enables a verifier to detect memory modification with 95{\%} probability if an attacker changes 20{\%} of the memory.",
keywords = "Smart grid, Smart meter, Software-based remote attestation",
author = "Kyoungsub Song and Dongwon Seo and Haemin Park and Heejo Lee and Adrian Perrig",
year = "2011",
month = "8",
day = "29",
doi = "10.1109/ISPAW.2011.37",
language = "English",
isbn = "9780769544298",
pages = "111--118",
booktitle = "Proceedings - 9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications Workshops, ISPAW 2011 - ICASE 2011, SGH 2011, GSDP 2011",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - OMAP

T2 - One-way memory attestation protocol for smart meters

AU - Song, Kyoungsub

AU - Seo, Dongwon

AU - Park, Haemin

AU - Lee, Heejo

AU - Perrig, Adrian

PY - 2011/8/29

Y1 - 2011/8/29

N2 - A smart meter is one of the key elements of smart girds. An attacker can compromise smart meters by injecting malicious codes, and take financial benefits by modifying memory contents of the smart meters. An attestation scheme can prevent such a memory forgery attack as verifying memory contents. In smart grids, however, attestation processes are remotely performed through networks by a faraway utility. Therefore, attestation processes are exposed to network attacks such as man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Even though existing attestation mechanisms detect local attacks such as the memory forgery, they are vulnerable to network attacks since they adopt a two-way attestation so-called a challenge-response protocol. In this paper, we propose a novel attestation mechanism, termed One-way Memory Attestation Protocol(OMAP), not only to detect local attacks, but also to defend against network attacks. Instead of using the two-way attestation, OMAP adopts an one-way attestation protocol; OMAP conducts a pre-defined internal algorithm, generates a checksum, and sends it to a verifier in one direction. Thus, OMAP does not require any information (e.g., challenges) from a verifier that can be exploitable by an adversary. In our experiments, as a smart meter scans only 0.004% of its memory, OMAP enables a verifier to detect memory modification with 95% probability if an attacker changes 20% of the memory.

AB - A smart meter is one of the key elements of smart girds. An attacker can compromise smart meters by injecting malicious codes, and take financial benefits by modifying memory contents of the smart meters. An attestation scheme can prevent such a memory forgery attack as verifying memory contents. In smart grids, however, attestation processes are remotely performed through networks by a faraway utility. Therefore, attestation processes are exposed to network attacks such as man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Even though existing attestation mechanisms detect local attacks such as the memory forgery, they are vulnerable to network attacks since they adopt a two-way attestation so-called a challenge-response protocol. In this paper, we propose a novel attestation mechanism, termed One-way Memory Attestation Protocol(OMAP), not only to detect local attacks, but also to defend against network attacks. Instead of using the two-way attestation, OMAP adopts an one-way attestation protocol; OMAP conducts a pre-defined internal algorithm, generates a checksum, and sends it to a verifier in one direction. Thus, OMAP does not require any information (e.g., challenges) from a verifier that can be exploitable by an adversary. In our experiments, as a smart meter scans only 0.004% of its memory, OMAP enables a verifier to detect memory modification with 95% probability if an attacker changes 20% of the memory.

KW - Smart grid

KW - Smart meter

KW - Software-based remote attestation

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=80051971317&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=80051971317&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/ISPAW.2011.37

DO - 10.1109/ISPAW.2011.37

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:80051971317

SN - 9780769544298

SP - 111

EP - 118

BT - Proceedings - 9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications Workshops, ISPAW 2011 - ICASE 2011, SGH 2011, GSDP 2011

ER -