On asymmetry in all-pay auctions

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper examines the role of asymmetry in all-pay auctions. In particular, this paper decomposes a change in players’ valuations into the absolute change and the relative change, and analyzes how these changes affect total expenditures. An increase in the sum of players’ valuations increases total expenditures but an increase in asymmetry among players’ valuations tends to decrease total expenditures under both complete and incomplete information. This paper also studies the optimal all-pay auction design problem.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)67-83
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
Volume28
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Mar 1

Keywords

  • All-pay auctions
  • Asymmetry
  • Deterministic contests

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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