On discrimination with competition between groups

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Statistical discrimination explains that two ex ante identical groups can have two different qualifications due to asymmetric information and self-fulfilling equilibria. In the typical statistical discrimination models, however, there is no interaction between groups. This paper offers a statistical discrimination model with a continuous signaling in which two groups compete for employment. We compare exclusive equilibria, in which no worker in one group makes a human capital investment, with symmetric equilibria, and show that discrimination as well as non-discrimination can be Pareto optimal under a certain environment.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-12
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
Volume30
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Dec

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Statistical discrimination
Discrimination
Human capital investment
Group interaction
Qualification
Workers
Asymmetric information
Non-discrimination

Keywords

  • Asymmetric information
  • Group inequality
  • Statistical discrimination

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

On discrimination with competition between groups. / Yoo, Seung Han.

In: Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, Vol. 30, No. 4, 12.2019, p. 1-12.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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