On Renegotiation-Proof Collusion under Imperfect Public Information

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We construct a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium in Green and Porter's (1984,Econometrica52, 87-100) imperfect public information model, which Pareto-dominates the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D43, D82.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)328-336
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1999 Apr
Externally publishedYes


  • Renegotiation-proof equilibrium; collusion; Cournot-Nash equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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