On security of XTR public key cryptosystems against side channel attacks

Dong Guk Han, Jong In Lim, Kouichi Sakurai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The XTR public key system was introduced at Crypto 2000. It is regarded that XTR is suitable for a variety of environments, including low-end smart cards, and XTR is the excellent alternative to either RSA or ECC. In [LV00a,SL01], authors remarked that XTR single exponentiation (XTR-SE) is less susceptible than usual exponentiation routines to environmental attacks such as timing attacks and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). In this paper, however, we investigate the security of side channel attack (SCA) on XTR. This paper shows that XTR-SE is immune against simple power analysis under assumption that the order of the computation of XTR-SE is carefully considered. However, we show that XTR-SE is vulnerable to Data-bit DPA, Address-bit DPA, and doubling attack. Moreover, we propose countermeasures that prevent the proposed attacks. As the proposed countermeasure against doubling attack is very inefficient, a good countermeasure against doubling attack is actually necessary to maintain the advantage of efficiency of XTR.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)454-465
Number of pages12
JournalLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume3108
Publication statusPublished - 2004 Dec 1

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Keywords

  • Address-bit DPA
  • Data-bit DPA
  • Doubling attack
  • Side Channel Attacks
  • SPA
  • XTR Public Key Cryptosystem

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Theoretical Computer Science

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