On the security of the Okamoto-Tanaka ID-based key exchange scheme against active attacks

Seungjoo Kim, Masahiro Mambo, Takeshi Okamotq, Hiroki Shizuya, Mitsuru Tada, Dongho Won

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

As far as the knowledge of authors, the rigorous security of Okamoto-Tanaka identity-based key exchange scheme was shown in [4] for the first time since its invention. However, the analysis deals with only the passive attack. In this paper, we give several models of active attacks against the scheme and show the rigorous security of the scheme in these models. We prove several relationships among attack models, including that (1) breaking the scheme in one attack model is equivalent to breaking the RSA public-key cryptosystem and (2) breaking the scheme in another attack model is equivalent to breaking the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme over Zn. The difference of the complexity stems from the difference of the timing of dishonest party's sending out and receiving messages.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)231-238
Number of pages8
JournalIEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
VolumeE84-A
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2001 Jan 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Signal Processing
  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

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