Optimal bid disclosure in patent license auctions under alternative modes of competition

Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The literature on patent license auctions in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning bid and stressed that this gives firms an incentive to bid high in order to signal an aggressive output strategy in a downstream Cournot market game, and conversely bid low to signal acquiescent pricing in a Bertrand market game. The present paper examines the information revealed by publishing the winning or the losing or no bid, assuming an oligopoly with differentiated goods. We rank disclosure rules and find that it is not optimal for the innovator to disclose the winning bid, regardless of the mode of competition.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-32
Number of pages32
JournalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Volume47
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016 Jul 1

Fingerprint

Costs
License
Patents
Auctions
Bid
Disclosure
Oligopoly
Market games
Incentives
Pricing
Innovators
Cournot

Keywords

  • Auctions
  • Innovation
  • Licensing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Industrial relations
  • Strategy and Management
  • Aerospace Engineering

Cite this

Optimal bid disclosure in patent license auctions under alternative modes of competition. / Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.

In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 47, 01.07.2016, p. 1-32.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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