Optimal quality scores in sponsored search auctions: Full extraction of advertisers' surplus

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper shows that the quality scores in sponsored search auctions can be optimally chosen to extract all the advertisers' surplus. The reason for the full extraction result is that the quality scores may effectively set all the bidders' valuations equal to the highest valuation, which induces intense bidding competition.

Original languageEnglish
Article number28
JournalB.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Volume10
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2010 Aug 10

    Fingerprint

Keywords

  • full extraction
  • online advertising
  • quality score
  • sponsored search

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this