Optimal robust allocation of private goods

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We characterize the optimal robust mechanisms for the allocation of private objects, where robust mechanisms are those mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality, and ex-post no budget deficit, and optimal robust mechanisms are the ones that maximize the expected sum of players’ payoffs among all robust mechanisms. With a certain assumption on the payoff of the lowest possible type, we provide a complete description of optimal robust mechanisms with any number of players and objects.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-15
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
Volume29
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Dec 1

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Individual rationality
Budget deficits
Incentive compatibility
Dominant strategy

Keywords

  • Budget balance
  • Dominant strategy
  • Ex-post individual rationality
  • Robust mechanism design

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Optimal robust allocation of private goods. / Yoon, Kiho.

In: Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, Vol. 29, No. 4, 01.12.2018, p. 1-15.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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