TY - JOUR
T1 - Optimal robust allocation of private goods
AU - Yoon, Kiho
N1 - Funding Information:
∗This work was supported by a Korea University Grant (K1709791). †Department of Economics, Korea University, 145 Anam-ro, Seongbuk-gu, 02841; kiho@korea.ac.kr; Tel.: +82-2-3290-2222; Fax.: +82-2-3290-2716
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Korean Econometric Society. All rights reserved.
PY - 2018/12
Y1 - 2018/12
N2 - We characterize the optimal robust mechanisms for the allocation of private objects, where robust mechanisms are those mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality, and ex-post no budget deficit, and optimal robust mechanisms are the ones that maximize the expected sum of players’ payoffs among all robust mechanisms. With a certain assumption on the payoff of the lowest possible type, we provide a complete description of optimal robust mechanisms with any number of players and objects.
AB - We characterize the optimal robust mechanisms for the allocation of private objects, where robust mechanisms are those mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality, and ex-post no budget deficit, and optimal robust mechanisms are the ones that maximize the expected sum of players’ payoffs among all robust mechanisms. With a certain assumption on the payoff of the lowest possible type, we provide a complete description of optimal robust mechanisms with any number of players and objects.
KW - Budget balance
KW - Dominant strategy
KW - Ex-post individual rationality
KW - Robust mechanism design
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85064940389&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85064940389
VL - 29
SP - 1
EP - 15
JO - Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
JF - Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
SN - 1229-2893
IS - 4
ER -