Abstract
We characterize the optimal robust mechanisms for the allocation of private objects, where robust mechanisms are those mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality, and ex-post no budget deficit, and optimal robust mechanisms are the ones that maximize the expected sum of players’ payoffs among all robust mechanisms. With a certain assumption on the payoff of the lowest possible type, we provide a complete description of optimal robust mechanisms with any number of players and objects.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-15 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Publication status | Published - 2018 Dec 1 |
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Keywords
- Budget balance
- Dominant strategy
- Ex-post individual rationality
- Robust mechanism design
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
Optimal robust allocation of private goods. / Yoon, Kiho.
In: Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, Vol. 29, No. 4, 01.12.2018, p. 1-15.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Optimal robust allocation of private goods
AU - Yoon, Kiho
PY - 2018/12/1
Y1 - 2018/12/1
N2 - We characterize the optimal robust mechanisms for the allocation of private objects, where robust mechanisms are those mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality, and ex-post no budget deficit, and optimal robust mechanisms are the ones that maximize the expected sum of players’ payoffs among all robust mechanisms. With a certain assumption on the payoff of the lowest possible type, we provide a complete description of optimal robust mechanisms with any number of players and objects.
AB - We characterize the optimal robust mechanisms for the allocation of private objects, where robust mechanisms are those mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality, and ex-post no budget deficit, and optimal robust mechanisms are the ones that maximize the expected sum of players’ payoffs among all robust mechanisms. With a certain assumption on the payoff of the lowest possible type, we provide a complete description of optimal robust mechanisms with any number of players and objects.
KW - Budget balance
KW - Dominant strategy
KW - Ex-post individual rationality
KW - Robust mechanism design
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85064940389&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85064940389&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85064940389
VL - 29
SP - 1
EP - 15
JO - Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
JF - Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
SN - 1229-2893
IS - 4
ER -