Abstract
We characterize the optimal robust mechanisms for the allocation of private objects, where robust mechanisms are those mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality, and ex-post no budget deficit, and optimal robust mechanisms are the ones that maximize the expected sum of players’ payoffs among all robust mechanisms. With a certain assumption on the payoff of the lowest possible type, we provide a complete description of optimal robust mechanisms with any number of players and objects.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-15 |
Number of pages | 15 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics |
Volume | 29 |
Issue number | 4 |
Publication status | Published - 2018 Dec 1 |
Keywords
- Budget balance
- Dominant strategy
- Ex-post individual rationality
- Robust mechanism design
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics