Petty corruption

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7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper analyzes a petty corruption model in which the entrepreneur's type is drawn from an absolutely continuous probability distribution function F over [0, 1], and perfect Bayesian equilibrium is adopted as the solution concept for a one-stage game. In the one-stage game, if there is more than one bureaucrat, no project is approved with a strictly positive probability. For an infinitely repeated game, I show that the single window policy strictly increases the social benefits in a socially optimal equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)267-280
Number of pages14
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume37
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008 Nov 1
Externally publishedYes

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Keywords

  • Corruption
  • Economic development
  • Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
  • Repeated games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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