Petty corruption

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper analyzes a petty corruption model in which the entrepreneur's type is drawn from an absolutely continuous probability distribution function F over [0, 1], and perfect Bayesian equilibrium is adopted as the solution concept for a one-stage game. In the one-stage game, if there is more than one bureaucrat, no project is approved with a strictly positive probability. For an infinitely repeated game, I show that the single window policy strictly increases the social benefits in a socially optimal equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)267-280
Number of pages14
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume37
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008 Nov 1
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Corruption
Social benefits
Solution concepts
Distribution function
Entrepreneurs
Probability distribution
Bureaucrats
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Infinitely repeated games

Keywords

  • Corruption
  • Economic development
  • Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
  • Repeated games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Petty corruption. / Yoo, Seung Han.

In: Economic Theory, Vol. 37, No. 2, 01.11.2008, p. 267-280.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Yoo, Seung Han. / Petty corruption. In: Economic Theory. 2008 ; Vol. 37, No. 2. pp. 267-280.
@article{24217c9c9cf145f0a3215063e55b8756,
title = "Petty corruption",
abstract = "This paper analyzes a petty corruption model in which the entrepreneur's type is drawn from an absolutely continuous probability distribution function F over [0, 1], and perfect Bayesian equilibrium is adopted as the solution concept for a one-stage game. In the one-stage game, if there is more than one bureaucrat, no project is approved with a strictly positive probability. For an infinitely repeated game, I show that the single window policy strictly increases the social benefits in a socially optimal equilibrium.",
keywords = "Corruption, Economic development, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Repeated games",
author = "Yoo, {Seung Han}",
year = "2008",
month = "11",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s00199-007-0299-3",
language = "English",
volume = "37",
pages = "267--280",
journal = "Economic Theory",
issn = "0938-2259",
publisher = "Springer New York",
number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Petty corruption

AU - Yoo, Seung Han

PY - 2008/11/1

Y1 - 2008/11/1

N2 - This paper analyzes a petty corruption model in which the entrepreneur's type is drawn from an absolutely continuous probability distribution function F over [0, 1], and perfect Bayesian equilibrium is adopted as the solution concept for a one-stage game. In the one-stage game, if there is more than one bureaucrat, no project is approved with a strictly positive probability. For an infinitely repeated game, I show that the single window policy strictly increases the social benefits in a socially optimal equilibrium.

AB - This paper analyzes a petty corruption model in which the entrepreneur's type is drawn from an absolutely continuous probability distribution function F over [0, 1], and perfect Bayesian equilibrium is adopted as the solution concept for a one-stage game. In the one-stage game, if there is more than one bureaucrat, no project is approved with a strictly positive probability. For an infinitely repeated game, I show that the single window policy strictly increases the social benefits in a socially optimal equilibrium.

KW - Corruption

KW - Economic development

KW - Perfect Bayesian equilibrium

KW - Repeated games

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=50249141955&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=50249141955&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s00199-007-0299-3

DO - 10.1007/s00199-007-0299-3

M3 - Article

VL - 37

SP - 267

EP - 280

JO - Economic Theory

JF - Economic Theory

SN - 0938-2259

IS - 2

ER -