TY - JOUR
T1 - Population uncertainty and revealing contestants
AU - Kim, Bara
AU - Yoo, Seung Han
N1 - Funding Information:
Kim’s research was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIT) (No. 2020R1A2B5B01001864 ). Yoo acknowledges financial support from a Korea University research grant.
PY - 2021/2
Y1 - 2021/2
N2 - A number of contestants randomly arrives according to a Poisson distribution. Under population uncertainty, a contest designer considers whether or not to reveal the number of players to bidders. We show that for the expected revenue, the two policies are equivalent, but for the expected winner's payment, the revealing policy dominates if the expected number of bidders is sufficiently large, whereas the concealing policy dominates if it is low.
AB - A number of contestants randomly arrives according to a Poisson distribution. Under population uncertainty, a contest designer considers whether or not to reveal the number of players to bidders. We show that for the expected revenue, the two policies are equivalent, but for the expected winner's payment, the revealing policy dominates if the expected number of bidders is sufficiently large, whereas the concealing policy dominates if it is low.
KW - Contest
KW - Environmental equivalence
KW - Population uncertainty
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U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109727
DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109727
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85100175700
VL - 199
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
SN - 0165-1765
M1 - 109727
ER -