Practical electromagnetic disturbance analysis on commercial contactless smartcards

Jaedeok Ji, Dong Guk Han, Seokwon Jung, Sangjin Lee, Jongsub Moon

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Contactless smart cards are being widely employed in electronic passports, monetary payments, access control systems, and so forth, because of their advantages such as convenience and ease of maintenance. In this paper, we present a new side-channel attack method for contactless smart cards. This method exploits the information leakage stemming from electromagnetic disturbances (EMD). We also made a convenient and low-cost EMD reader board that performs side-channel attacks on contactless smart cards. In order to demonstrate that EMDs can become another information-leakage side channel, we have carried out side-channel analysis on a commercial contactless smart card that performs 128-bit ARIA encryptions, and we have been able to successfully find all 16 bytes of the ARIA key from the target device. From our experimental results, we conclude that the proposed EMD analysis yields better results than the conventional power analysis.

Original languageEnglish
Article number142610
JournalInternational Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
Volume2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Jan 1

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Smart cards
Access control
Cryptography
Control systems
Costs
Side channel attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Engineering(all)

Cite this

Practical electromagnetic disturbance analysis on commercial contactless smartcards. / Ji, Jaedeok; Han, Dong Guk; Jung, Seokwon; Lee, Sangjin; Moon, Jongsub.

In: International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, Vol. 2014, 142610, 01.01.2014.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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