Quality improvement incentive strategies in a supply chain

Seung Ho Yoo, Tae Su Cheong

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper investigates several incentive mechanisms for collaborative product quality improvement in a buyer-driven supply chain, and the impacts of those mechanisms on supply chain performance. The buyer, the Stackelberg leader, determines the sales price of a product while the supplier is responsible for production and product quality determination. We develop analytical models incorporating two reward schemes to better understand how the buyer can facilitate the supplier's quality improvement efforts. We offer managerial insights and practical guidelines for implementing quality management in the supply chain, derived from both an analytical comparison and numerical experiments.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)331-342
Number of pages12
JournalTransportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
Volume114
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Jun 1

Fingerprint

Supply chains
incentive
supply
supplier
quality management
Quality management
sales
reward
Analytical models
Sales
leader
experiment
performance
Incentives
Buyers
Supply chain
Quality improvement
Experiments
Suppliers
Product quality

Keywords

  • Incentive
  • Quality management
  • Reward contract
  • Supply chain
  • Target quality

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Civil and Structural Engineering
  • Transportation

Cite this

Quality improvement incentive strategies in a supply chain. / Yoo, Seung Ho; Cheong, Tae Su.

In: Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Vol. 114, 01.06.2018, p. 331-342.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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