Regulating wireless access costs for not vertically integrated content providers

Xinyi Hu, George Kesidis, Seung Jun Baek

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider a single, unaffiliated streaming content provider (CP) and another that is vertically integrated (affiliated) with a cellular wireless ISP. We formulate a non-cooperative game between these two CPs involving, e.g., linear demand-response to price by the end-users with long-duration sessions (e.g., streaming video), and a model as amplified noise of additional network delay jitter and reduced responsiveness to changing channel conditions by the unaffiliated CP. The effect of effective additional side-payments from the unaffiliated CP to the ISP, as may be set by a government regulator, is studied at Stackelberg equilibrium both analytically and numerically.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2017 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages1-8
Number of pages8
Volume2018-January
ISBN (Electronic)9783901882982
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Jan 12
Event13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017 - Tokyo, Japan
Duration: 2017 Nov 262017 Nov 30

Other

Other13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017
CountryJapan
CityTokyo
Period17/11/2617/11/30

Fingerprint

Video streaming
Jitter
Costs
Stackelberg Equilibrium
Non-cooperative Game
Video Streaming
Streaming
Regulator
Integrated
Model

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Information Systems and Management
  • Control and Optimization

Cite this

Hu, X., Kesidis, G., & Baek, S. J. (2018). Regulating wireless access costs for not vertically integrated content providers. In 2017 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017 (Vol. 2018-January, pp. 1-8). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.23919/CNSM.2017.8255995

Regulating wireless access costs for not vertically integrated content providers. / Hu, Xinyi; Kesidis, George; Baek, Seung Jun.

2017 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017. Vol. 2018-January Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. p. 1-8.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Hu, X, Kesidis, G & Baek, SJ 2018, Regulating wireless access costs for not vertically integrated content providers. in 2017 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017. vol. 2018-January, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 1-8, 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017, Tokyo, Japan, 17/11/26. https://doi.org/10.23919/CNSM.2017.8255995
Hu X, Kesidis G, Baek SJ. Regulating wireless access costs for not vertically integrated content providers. In 2017 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017. Vol. 2018-January. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2018. p. 1-8 https://doi.org/10.23919/CNSM.2017.8255995
Hu, Xinyi ; Kesidis, George ; Baek, Seung Jun. / Regulating wireless access costs for not vertically integrated content providers. 2017 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017. Vol. 2018-January Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. pp. 1-8
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