Related key differential attacks on 27 rounds of XTEA and full-round GOST

Youngdai Ko, Seokhie Hong, Wonil Lee, Sangjin Lee, Ju Sung Kang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

47 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we present a related key truncated differential attack on 27 rounds of XTEA which is the best known attack so far. With an expected success rate of 96.9%, we can attack 27 rounds of XTEA using 220.5 chosen plaintexts and with a complexity of 2115.15 27-round XTEA encryptions. We also propose several attacks on GOST. First, we present a distinguishing attack on full-round GOST, which can distinguish it from a random permutation with probability 1-2-64 using a related key differential characteristic. We also show that H. Seki et al.'s idea combined with our related key differential characteristic can be applied to attack 31 rounds of GOST . Lastly, we propose a related key differential attack on full-round GOST. In this attack, we can recover 12 bits of the master key with 235 chosen plaintexts, 236 encryption operations and an expected success rate of 91.7%.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)299-316
Number of pages18
JournalLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume3017
Publication statusPublished - 2004 Dec 1

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Cryptography
Attack
Encryption
Distinguishing Attack
Random Permutation

Keywords

  • Differential characteristic
  • Distinguishing attack
  • GOST
  • Related key differential attack
  • XTEA

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Theoretical Computer Science

Cite this

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abstract = "In this paper, we present a related key truncated differential attack on 27 rounds of XTEA which is the best known attack so far. With an expected success rate of 96.9{\%}, we can attack 27 rounds of XTEA using 220.5 chosen plaintexts and with a complexity of 2115.15 27-round XTEA encryptions. We also propose several attacks on GOST. First, we present a distinguishing attack on full-round GOST, which can distinguish it from a random permutation with probability 1-2-64 using a related key differential characteristic. We also show that H. Seki et al.'s idea combined with our related key differential characteristic can be applied to attack 31 rounds of GOST . Lastly, we propose a related key differential attack on full-round GOST. In this attack, we can recover 12 bits of the master key with 235 chosen plaintexts, 236 encryption operations and an expected success rate of 91.7{\%}.",
keywords = "Differential characteristic, Distinguishing attack, GOST, Related key differential attack, XTEA",
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N2 - In this paper, we present a related key truncated differential attack on 27 rounds of XTEA which is the best known attack so far. With an expected success rate of 96.9%, we can attack 27 rounds of XTEA using 220.5 chosen plaintexts and with a complexity of 2115.15 27-round XTEA encryptions. We also propose several attacks on GOST. First, we present a distinguishing attack on full-round GOST, which can distinguish it from a random permutation with probability 1-2-64 using a related key differential characteristic. We also show that H. Seki et al.'s idea combined with our related key differential characteristic can be applied to attack 31 rounds of GOST . Lastly, we propose a related key differential attack on full-round GOST. In this attack, we can recover 12 bits of the master key with 235 chosen plaintexts, 236 encryption operations and an expected success rate of 91.7%.

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