Resource pricing game in geo-distributed clouds

Heejun Roh, Cheoulhoon Jung, Wonjun Lee, Ding Zhu Du

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Cloud computing enables larger classes of application service providers to distribute their services to world-wide users in multiple regions without their own private data centers. Heterogeneity and resource limitation of geo-graphically distributed cloud data centers impose application service providers to have incentives to optimize their computing resource usage while guaranteeing some level of quality of service. Recent studies proposed various techniques for optimization of computing resource usage from cloud users (or application service providers) perspective with little consideration of competition. In addition, optimization efforts of application service providers motivate cloud service providers owning multiple geo-distributed clouds to decide their computing resource prices considering their efforts. In this context, we formulate this problem for cloud service providers as a game of resource pricing in geo-distributed clouds. One of the main challenges in this problem is how to model the best responses of application service providers, given resource price information of clouds in non-overlapped regions. We propose a novel concave game to describe the quantity competition among application service providers reducing payment while guaranteeing fair service delay to end users. Furthermore, we optimize the prices of computing resources to converge to the equilibrium. In addition, we show several characteristics of the equilibrium point and discuss their implications to design computing resource markets for geo-distributed clouds.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
Pages1519-1527
Number of pages9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013 Sep 2
Event32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2013 - Turin, Italy
Duration: 2013 Apr 142013 Apr 19

Other

Other32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2013
CountryItaly
CityTurin
Period13/4/1413/4/19

Fingerprint

Costs
Cloud computing
Quality of service

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Roh, H., Jung, C., Lee, W., & Du, D. Z. (2013). Resource pricing game in geo-distributed clouds. In Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM (pp. 1519-1527). [6566947] https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6566947

Resource pricing game in geo-distributed clouds. / Roh, Heejun; Jung, Cheoulhoon; Lee, Wonjun; Du, Ding Zhu.

Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM. 2013. p. 1519-1527 6566947.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Roh, H, Jung, C, Lee, W & Du, DZ 2013, Resource pricing game in geo-distributed clouds. in Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM., 6566947, pp. 1519-1527, 32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2013, Turin, Italy, 13/4/14. https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6566947
Roh H, Jung C, Lee W, Du DZ. Resource pricing game in geo-distributed clouds. In Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM. 2013. p. 1519-1527. 6566947 https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6566947
Roh, Heejun ; Jung, Cheoulhoon ; Lee, Wonjun ; Du, Ding Zhu. / Resource pricing game in geo-distributed clouds. Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM. 2013. pp. 1519-1527
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