Rethinking chosen-ciphertext security under Kerckhoffs' assumption

Seungjoo Kim, Masahiro Mambo, Yuliang Zheng

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Kerckhoffs' assumption states that an attacker must be assumed to have full knowledge of all the details of a cryptosystem except information about encryption/decryption keys upon which security of the cryptosystem rests entirely. In this paper we generalize the assumption to allow an attacker to have access to intermediate results during the computational process of cryptographic operations. We show that the generalized assumption models quite well such real world attacks as the "memory reconstruction attack" and the "memory core-dump attackwhich may be mounted by computer forensic software or computer viruses. We further analyze a number of public key encryption schemes under the generalized Kerckhoffs' assumption, and demonstrate that some of the schemes, although provably secure under some computational assumptions, may be broken if an attacker has access to intermediate results during a decryption operation.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
EditorsMarc Joye
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages227-243
Number of pages17
ISBN (Print)3540008470, 9783540008477
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2003
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume2612
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Keywords

  • Chosen-ciphertext security
  • Kerckhoffs' assumption
  • Provable security

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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  • Cite this

    Kim, S., Mambo, M., & Zheng, Y. (2003). Rethinking chosen-ciphertext security under Kerckhoffs' assumption. In M. Joye (Ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (pp. 227-243). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 2612). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36563-x_16