Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation

Jinhyuk Lee, Jaeok Park

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies second-price auctions in which bidders make participation decisions sequentially in an exogenous order and participating bidders incur bidding costs. When bidders decide whether to participate or not, they know their own valuations as well as earlier bidders’ participation decisions. To analyze bidders’ participation and bidding decisions, we study equilibria in cutoff strategies with which a bidder participates and bids his valuation if his valuation exceeds a cutoff given his observation on earlier bidders’ participation. Focusing on the case of two bidders, we present two main results on comparative statics and revenue comparison. In the comparative statics analysis, we study the effects of a change in bidders’ characteristics on equilibrium cutoffs. In revenue comparison, we show that the considered sequential entry format yields lower revenue than the simultaneous entry counterpart. Finally, we discuss the difficulties in generalizing these two results for the case of more than two bidders.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)567-586
Number of pages20
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume62
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016 Aug 1

Fingerprint

Second-price auction
Participation
Revenue
Bidding
Comparative statics
Costs
Comparative static analysis
Sequential entry
Bid

Keywords

  • Cutoff equilibria
  • Participation costs
  • Second-price auctions
  • Sequential participation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation. / Lee, Jinhyuk; Park, Jaeok.

In: Economic Theory, Vol. 62, No. 3, 01.08.2016, p. 567-586.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Lee, Jinhyuk ; Park, Jaeok. / Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation. In: Economic Theory. 2016 ; Vol. 62, No. 3. pp. 567-586.
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