Security analysis of an identity-based strongly unforgeable signature scheme

Kwangsu Lee, Dong Hoon Lee

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Identity-based signature (IBS) is a specific type of public-key signature (PKS) where any identity string ID can be used for the public key of a user. Although an IBS scheme can be constructed from any PKS scheme by using the certificate paradigm, it is still important to construct an efficient IBS scheme with short signature under the standard assumption without relying on random oracles. Recently, Kwon proposed an IBS scheme and claimed its strong unforgeability under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. In this paper, we show that the security proof of Kwon is seriously flawed. To show the flaws, we first show that there exists a distinguisher that can distinguish the distribution of simulated signatures from that of real signatures. Next, we also show that the simulator of Kwon's security argument cannot extract the solution of the CDH problem even if there exists an adversary that forges the signature. Therefore, the security of the Kwon's IBS scheme is not related to the hardness of the CDH assumption.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)29-34
Number of pages6
JournalInformation Sciences
Volume286
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Dec 1

Fingerprint

Identity-based Signature
Identity-based
Security Analysis
Signature Scheme
Simulators
Hardness
Diffie-Hellman
Public key
Signature
Defects
Short Signature
Security Proof
Random Oracle
Certificate
Simulator
Strings
Paradigm
Security analysis

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Information Systems and Management

Cite this

Security analysis of an identity-based strongly unforgeable signature scheme. / Lee, Kwangsu; Lee, Dong Hoon.

In: Information Sciences, Vol. 286, 01.12.2014, p. 29-34.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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