Security weakness in an authenticated group key agreement protocol in two rounds

Jung Yeon Hwang, Kyu Young Choi, Dong Hoon Lee

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Dutta and Barua recently proposed an efficient authenticated group key agreement protocol for dynamic membership. To reduce computation overhead, the protocol makes use of a simplified authentication mechanism such that only two neighbors of a participant check if a message is originated from the participant. In this paper, we show that the authenticated group key agreement protocol has some security breaches caused by the restrictive authentication. In addition, we present a simple method to fix the security breaches and prove its security under the standard assumptions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3719-3724
Number of pages6
JournalComputer Communications
Volume31
Issue number15
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008 Sep 25

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Keywords

  • Authentication
  • Group communication
  • Group key agreement

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Security weakness in an authenticated group key agreement protocol in two rounds. / Hwang, Jung Yeon; Choi, Kyu Young; Lee, Dong Hoon.

In: Computer Communications, Vol. 31, No. 15, 25.09.2008, p. 3719-3724.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Hwang, Jung Yeon ; Choi, Kyu Young ; Lee, Dong Hoon. / Security weakness in an authenticated group key agreement protocol in two rounds. In: Computer Communications. 2008 ; Vol. 31, No. 15. pp. 3719-3724.
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