Selectively chosen ciphertext security in threshold public-key encryption

Kitak Kim, Jong Hwan Park, Dong Hoon Lee

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Threshold public-key encryption can control decryption abilities of an authorized user group in such a way that each user of the group can produce only a decryption share and at least t of them should collect decryption shares to recover a message. We present a new threshold public-key encryption that is secure against selectively chosen ciphertext attacks. Semantic security against chosen ciphertext adversaries is the de facto level of security for public-key encryption deployed in practice because many encryption systems are broken in a model of chosen ciphertext security. The security of the proposed system is formally proved without random oracles under a new assumption. We also provide proof of the intractability of our assumption in the generic group model.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)189-200
Number of pages12
JournalSecurity and Communication Networks
Volume9
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016 Feb 1

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Cryptography
Computer systems
Semantics

Keywords

  • Chosen ciphertext attacks
  • Chosen plaintext attacks
  • Threshold public-key encryption

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Information Systems

Cite this

Selectively chosen ciphertext security in threshold public-key encryption. / Kim, Kitak; Park, Jong Hwan; Lee, Dong Hoon.

In: Security and Communication Networks, Vol. 9, No. 3, 01.02.2016, p. 189-200.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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