Side-channel attack using meet-in-the-middle technique

Jongsung Kim, Seokhie Hong

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a new side-channel attack using block cipher cryptanalysis named a meet-in-the-middle attack. Using our new side-channel technique we show that advanced encryption standard (AES) with reduced 10 masked rounds is broken, which is faster than the exhaustive key search attack. This implies that one has to mask the entire rounds of the 12-round 192-bit key AES to prevent our attacks. Our result is the first one to analyse AES with reduced 10 masked rounds, while the previous best known side-channel attack is on AES with reduced eight masked rounds.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)934-938
Number of pages5
JournalComputer Journal
Volume53
Issue number7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010 Sep 1

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Cryptography
Masks
Side channel attack

Keywords

  • AES
  • hamming weight measurement
  • security
  • side-channel attak

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Side-channel attack using meet-in-the-middle technique. / Kim, Jongsung; Hong, Seokhie.

In: Computer Journal, Vol. 53, No. 7, 01.09.2010, p. 934-938.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Kim, Jongsung ; Hong, Seokhie. / Side-channel attack using meet-in-the-middle technique. In: Computer Journal. 2010 ; Vol. 53, No. 7. pp. 934-938.
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