Single Trace Attack on Key Reconciliation Process for Quantum Key Distribution

Dongjun Park, Donghoe Heo, Suhri Kim, Seokhie Hong

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we propose the first single trace side-channel attack on the key reconciliation process for the quantum key distribution (QKD) system. Through a single power consumption trace measured during the syndrome computation of the key reconciliation process on the sender's side, we were able to fully recover the sifted key and the syndrome. The shared secret key between the two users can be directly obtained from the sifted key and the syndrome. The result of our work shows that the QKD system must consider side-channel attacks on the key reconciliation process for its practical use.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationICTC 2020 - 11th International Conference on ICT Convergence
Subtitle of host publicationData, Network, and AI in the Age of Untact
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages209-213
Number of pages5
ISBN (Electronic)9781728167589
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020 Oct 21
Event11th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence, ICTC 2020 - Jeju Island, Korea, Republic of
Duration: 2020 Oct 212020 Oct 23

Publication series

NameInternational Conference on ICT Convergence
Volume2020-October
ISSN (Print)2162-1233
ISSN (Electronic)2162-1241

Conference

Conference11th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence, ICTC 2020
CountryKorea, Republic of
CityJeju Island
Period20/10/2120/10/23

Keywords

  • quantum key distribution
  • side-channel attack
  • single trace attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Information Systems
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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